Connor v. Grosso [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
7-7-1953
Connor v. Grosso [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Connor v. Grosso [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 294.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/294
July 1953] CoNNOR v. GRosso 
f41 C.2d 229; 259 P.2d 4351 
229 
in effect.'' As so modified the judgment is affirmed. De-
fendant Paul Grosso is to bear the costs of this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22312. In Bank. July 7, 1953.] 
NAN VIC'rORIA TRUE CONNOR, Respondent, v. PAUL 
,J. GROSSO et al., Appellants. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Liability for Torts.-Mere fact that one 
defendant is wife of other and holds property with him as a 
joint tenant does not establish her liability for a tort com-
mitted by him. 
[2a, 2b] Trespass-Evidence.-vVhere evidence relating to amount 
of dirt, rocks and other debris dumped on plaintiff's property 
indicates that some of such material was dumped by persons 
other than defendants, a finding that defendants dumped all 
of it is without support. 
[3] Id.-Evidence.-Where there is a conflict of evidence as to 
amount of dirt dumped on plaintiff's property, trier of fact 
could resolve such conflict in favor of plaintiff. 
[4] Id.-Damages.-A defendant sued for damages for injuries to 
real property should be required to pay cost of removing any 
slippage that may reasonably occur in course of removing dirt 
and other debris which he dumped on plaintiff's property. 
[5] Id.-Parties.-Where defendant in dumping dirt on plaintiff's 
land, did not act in concert with other persons dumping dirt 
on plaintiff's land, he cannot be required to pay for removal 
of dirt dumped by them. 
[6] New Trial-Award as to Part of Issues-Damages.-Where 
defendant has had a fair trial on issue of liability for dumping 
dirt on plaintiff's property, the findings on that issue are amply 
supported by the evidence, and the only issue on which a 
[1] Liability of wife for husband's torts by virtue of mere 
ownership of property in connection with which tort occurred, 
note, 12 A.L.R. 1459, 1463. See, also, Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, 
§ 6; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 487. 
[ 6] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife,§ 13; [2, 3] Tres-
pass,§ 24; [4] Trespass, § 26; [5] Trespass, § 11; [6] New Trial, 
§ 15.1. 
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judgment for plaintiff is not supported by the evidence is the 
amount of compensatory damages, a new trial may he ordered 
only as to issue of such damages. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for damag·es for injuries to real property. Judgment 
against defendant Madolyn A. Grosso reversed with directions 
that judgment be entered in her favor; judgment against de-
fendant Paul A. Grosso reversed with directions for retrial on 
issue of compensatory damages only. 
W. P. Smith and Henry F. Walker for Appellants. 
Stanton, Stanton & W elbourn for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This action was consolidated for trial with 
Herzog v. Grosso, ante, p. 219 [259 P.2d 429]. The trial 
court found that defendants Paul Grosso and Madolyn Grosso 
deposited 3,184 cubic yards of material on plaintiff Nan 
Connor's property and entered judgment against both de-
fendants for $4,362.08. 
Defendant Madolyn Grosso contends that the award of 
damages against her is not supported by the evidence.* We 
agree. [1] The fact that Paul Grosso was her husband 
and that he held the property with her as a joint tenant does 
not establish her liability. (Goldman v. House, 93 Cal.App. 
2d 572, 576 [209 P.2d 639] ; Citizens State Bank v. Hoffman, 
44 Cal.App.2d 854, 855 [113 P.2d 211] .) In Brown v. Oxtoby, 
45 Cal.App.2d 702, 709 [114 P.2d 622], and similar cases relied 
upon by plaintiff, there was evidence that the wife actively 
participated in the tort, or that the husband acted as her 
agent, or that she ratified his conduct. Plaintiff pleaded a 
cause of action against Madolyn Grosso, but no evidence was 
introduced to support her allegations, although the case was 
vigorously contested and on trial for seven days. The trial 
court will therefore be directed to enter judgment for Madolyn 
Grosso. (Code Civ. Proc., §53; see Burtis v. Universal Pic-
tures Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823, 835 [256 P.2d 933].) 
[2a] The trial court found that defendants "dumped upon 
*In the companion case of Herzog v. Grosso, ante, p. 219 [259 P.2d 
429], the award of damages was against Paul Grosso only. 
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said real property of plaintiff 3,184 cubic yards of dirt, rocks 
and other debris'' and that the ''cost of removal of said 
material so unlawfully dumped upon said real property of 
plaintiff, including slippage necessarily incidental to such 
removal, is the sum of $4,362.08." Defendants' contention 
that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence is 
sustained by the record. Before defendants acquired their 
property, a considerable amount of dirt had already been 
dumped on the Connor property by Herzog and Mrs. Schneider 
in the course of building the road on parcel 3, filling in the 
ground near the telephone pole, and leveling land between 
the road on parcels 2 and 3 and the road to the top of the 
hill. Defendants acquired the hilltop property in March, 
1949. Defendant Paul Grosso dumped dirt on the Connor 
property in November, 1949, when he regraded his road, and 
again in September, 1950, when he built the ramp across the 
fill. 
[3] One witness, Bert Willis, testified that to restore the 
Connor property to its natural condition by removing all 
of the fill and the dirt that would fall in upon removal 
thereof, would require excavation of 3,184 cubic yards of 
dirt at a cost of $4,362.08.* Another witness, Kenneth Cook, 
testified that the last fill, in September, 1950, amounted to 
1,570¥2 yards. According to Willis, removal of 1,5701;2 yards 
would cost $2,625.84. Witnesses called by defendants testified 
that Grosso dumped only 150 yards of dirt on the Connor 
property but the trier of fact could, of course, resolve the 
conflict in the evidence in favor of plaintiff. Neither party 
introduced evidence showing the depreciation in value of 
plaintiff's property caused by the dumping of the dirt. 
[ 4] Defendant, of course, should be required to pay the 
cost of removing any slippage that may reasonably occur in 
the course of removing the material that he dumped on plain-
*Willis testified that he based his computation on the amount of filled 
ground lying between the red line and the dotted line on plaintiff's ex-
hibit C-2. That exhibit is a survey map prepared by witness Cook. He 
testified that the red line represented the boundary between the Connor 
property and parcels 2 and 3, and that the dotted line indicated the 
bottom of the fill on the Connor property. Cook stated that he dug four 
test holes in the fill and concluded that only part of the dirt in the fill 
could be attributed to the last dumping on the Connor land. 
The trial court asked Willis, ''I take it from your testimony so far, 
Mr. Willis, that what you are conveying is that it would require the 
removal of 3,184 yards to restore the Connor property to its original 
ground level." (Emphasis added.) The witness replied, "That is right, 
sir.'' 
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tiff's property. The evidence, viewed most favorably to plain-
tiff, shows that Grosso actually dumped 1,570% cubic yards 
of material on plaintiff's property and that to remove all the 
fill, including material dumped by other persons, plus the 
dirt that would slide down the hill from parcels 2 and 3 dur-
ing such removal, it would be necessary to excavate 3,184 
cubic yards. There is no evidence that the material previously 
dumped by other persons, lying under the dirt subsequently 
dumped by Grosso, would have to be removed in order to 
remove the dirt dumped by him. Nor is there any evidence 
to show the amount of dirt that will slide down the hill 
if only the 1,570% yards dumped by Grosso were removed. 
[5] Since Grosso did not act in concert with the other per-
sons dumping dirt on the Connor land, he cannot be required 
to pay for removal of the dirt dumped by them. (Slater v. 
Pacific American Oil Co., 212 Cal. 648, 654 [300 P. 31]; 
Prosser, Torts, p. 333.) [2b] The judgment holds Grosso 
responsible for all the dirt fill on the Connor property and is 
thus without adequate support in the evidence. 
[6] Defendant argues that the error in the award of 
damages requires a complete new trial. AfteF a lengthy 
trial, the trial court resolved the question of liability in favor 
of plaintiff and the question of exemplary damages in favor 
of defendants. The only issue on which the judgment is not 
supported by the evidence is the amount of compensatory 
damages, and we are of the opinion that a separate trial on 
that issue will expedite the administration of justice and will 
not deny defendant Paul Grosso a fair trial, for he has already 
had a fair trial on the issue of liability, and the trial court's 
findings on that issue are amply supported by the evidence. 
The judgment against defendant Madolyn A. Grosso is 
reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter judgment 
in her favor. The judgment against defendant Paul A. 
Grosso is reversed, and the trial court is directed to retry 
the issue of compensatory damages only. Madolyn Grosso 
shall recover her costs on appeal. The other parties shall 
bear their own costs. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J .--I dissent. I take particular exception to 
the order directing the trial court to enter judgment in favor 
of Madolyn Grosso. Even if we can properly conclude that 
the evidence on this record is insufficient to support the 
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judgment against her we have no right to assume that on a 
new trial no additional evidence against her could be pro-
duced. 
It further appears to me to be inaccurate to state in the 
opinion that '' 'l'he only issue on which the judgment is not 
supported by the evidence is the amount of compensatory 
damages ... '' and at the same time to order a new trial on 
the issue of the amount of compensatory damages as against 
Paul Grosso while directing a judgment in favor of Madolyn. 
In my view, on the state of the record, and on the facts 
and law stated in the majority opinion, there should be a 
complete new trial on all issues as to all parties. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
I think it is clear that the evidence is sufficient to support 
the award of damages and a new trial on that issue should 
not be ordered. 
The majority opinion proceeds upon the theory that plain-
tiff was not entitled to the cost of removing more dirt than 
was actually dumped on her property even though it would 
require the removal of the additional amount to effectively 
remove the amount dumped and that there is no evidence 
that the removal of the additional amount was necessary to 
effectively remove the amount dumped. 
The nrst proposition is manifestly untenable. It is the 
same as saying in a case where plaintiff was entitled to dam-
ages for an injury to the motor of his car that he could re-
cover for the damage to the motor but not the expense of 
repairing it where part of the cost of repair was the removal 
and replacement of other parts although necessary to repair 
the motor. The evidence clearly supports the necessity of re-
moving the additional soil. 
The majority holds that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that defendant Grosso 
dumped 3,184 yards of soil on plaintiff's property and hence 
damaged her in the sum of $4,367 .08, being arrived at by 
computing the cost of removal of the dirt at $1.37 per yard. 
There is enough evidence, on the theory that while the total 
yardage of soil dumped on plaintiff's land may have been 
1,570% instead of 3,184, it would require the removal of the 
latter amount because to remove effectively the 1,570 yards, 
an additional amount, up to the 3,184 yards, must be re-
moved because of the sliding of other soil onto plaintiff's 
land as the result of removing the 1,570 yards. 
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While Cook testified that 1,570 yards had been dumped 
on plaintiff's land, plaintiff's expert (Willis) on removal of 
the soil and the cost thereof, testified: 
"Q. Now, at my request, Mr. Willis, did you make an esti-
mate of the amount of filled ground represented on this map 
that I have referred to, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C-2, that lies be-
tween the Connor property line or the red line and the mark 
with the dotted line entitled 'rroe of spill from road' 1" 
''THE CouRT: ·what end? 
"MR. STAN'TON: \Vell, all the ground enclosed within that 
curved line and the red line. 
''A. Yes, I did, but in addition to that I went back to the 
nattmil contour of the land. You couldn't excavate it to 
you.r property line without sliding back of your property 
line, so we went back of the property line to the orig·inal con-
tours of the hill. 
"Q. Why did you do that, Mr. Willis~ A. 'l'o excavate at a 
vertical line at the property line, you couldn't hold the ma-
tM·ial above it, yon would slide clown into the property. 
"Q. In other words, in making your estimate of yardage, 
yon had in mind the removal of that dirt. Is that correct 1 
A. That is right. 
'' Q. Then if you removed right along the property line, 
it is your best estimate that the other dirt would fall into 
place and that would have to be removed as well? A. That 
is right. 
"Q. Now, you were asked to estimate the amount of cubic 
yards of dirt necessary to remove along that property line, 
were you not~ A. That is right. 
'' Q. What was your estimate of the total number of cubic 
yards of earth? A. 3184 cubic yards. 
"Q. That includes not only the amount of earth in the fill 
itself, but also the yardage of earth which you estimate would 
fall into the fill, were the present fill in the Connor property 
removed? A. Yes.'' (Emphasis added.) 
''THE CouRT: I take it from your testimony so far, Mr. 
·willis, that what you are conveying is that it would require 
the removal of 3184 yards to restore the Connor property 
to its original ground level.'' 
That testimony is at least reasonably susceptible of the 
construction that in order to remove the soil dumped on the 
land by Grosso it would be necessary to remove the soil to 
the original contour of the land because otherwise if you 
removed only the part dumped, other soil would slide down 
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leaving soil on the property the same as before; that to re-
move all of the soil necessary to restore plaintiff's land, 3,184 
yards must be removed. This is in accord with the finding 
of the trial court. 
This being the state of the record, there is ample evidence 
to support the finding of the trial court as to the amount 
of damages suffered by plaintiff and the judgment should. 
therefore, be affirmed. 
[L. A. No. 22656. In Bank. July 7, 1953.] 
HELEN C. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF LONG 
BEACH et al., Respondents. 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Employees-Removal- Proceedings. 
-Municipal civil service board has authority to proceed with 
hearing of dismissal charges against stenographer in classified 
civil service, notwithstanding such charges are preferred by 
chairman of board rather than by city manager, where under 
city charter the power to suspend or dismiss person in classi-
fied civil service is vested in either head of department or city 
manager, and any qualified elector may file written charges. 
[2] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Trial De Novo.-A dis-
missed civil service employee seeking to compel city to permit 
~her to resume her duties is not entitled to a trial de novo in the 
superior court, but only to a review of proceedings before 
local board acting as a quasi-judicial body empowered to make 
final adjudications of fact in connection with matters properly 
submitted to it. 
[3] !d.-Judicial Review-Hearing.-On judicial review of order 
of local administrative body, trial court does not have right 
' to judge of intrinsic value of evidence or to weigh it; its power 
·is confined to determining whether there was substantial evi-
dence before board to sustain its findings. 
[4] !d.-Judicial Review-Hearing.-In reviewing proceedings be-
fore local administrative board, court is bound to disregard 
evidence contrary to that received in support of findings of 
board. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, § 233; 
Am.Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 223. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations,§ 311; [2-4] 
Administrative Law, § 22; [ 5, 6] Evidence, § 483; [7] Evidence, 
§ 497; [8-10, 13] Municipal Corporations, § 313; [11] Municipal 
Corporations, § 307; [12] Evidence, § 563; Witnesses, § 281. 
